Peck

Peck security overview

DEVLIN.AI LLC · November 2026 · for security reviewers

Peck is a desktop app for macOS and Windows that runs AI coding agents (Claude Code and Codex), each in its own container on the person's computer. An optional iPhone app and relay let the person steer it from elsewhere. This document describes how Peck is built to be safe, what leaves the computer and what Peck does not protect against.

1. Architecture

 ┌──────────────────────── the person's computer ─────────────────────────┐
 │  Peck (Electron main process)                                          │
 │   ├─ settings, keychain-encrypted secrets, audit log (private folder)  │
 │   ├─ local API for the in-container `peck` CLI (per-workspace token)   │
 │   └─ container engine (Docker Desktop / OrbStack / Lima / WSL)         │
 │        ├─ workspace container: agent + project worktree + firewall     │
 │        ├─ workspace container: …                                       │
 │        └─ Orchestrator container: read-only dev folder + firewall      │
 └──────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────┘
                │ agents → the person's AI provider │ (optional) E2E-encrypted
                │ (Anthropic / OpenAI / Bedrock /   │ relay on Cloudflare
                │  Vertex / company gateway)        ▼
                ▼                              iPhone / other computers

Peck doesn't pay for, resell or route model usage. The agents call the person's AI provider directly, under the person's own account.

2. What leaves the computer

Destination When What
The person's AI provider While agents work The prompts and code the agent sends, under the person's account
GitHub When GitHub is connected Sign-in, clone and push of the person's repositories, pull request status
Package registries and approved domains From inside containers What the project installs; only domains on the firewall allowlist
Context7 (mcp.context7.com), a documentation service While agents work, on by default Peck's default settings give agents Context7 as a tool, so it is allowed in every workspace and an agent may send it documentation look-ups (library names and questions). It is a third party that the agent talks to directly. It can be turned off in Settings → Claude setup, or per project.
GitHub's published address list (api.github.com/meta) When a workspace's firewall is applied, at most once a day A request with no sign-in, to learn GitHub's network ranges for the firewall. GitHub sees the IP address. Peck does the same with Stripe's list only when api.stripe.com is allowed.
GitHub Releases Update checks, unless turned off by policy Download requests
Cloudflare (Peck relay) Only when remote access is on End-to-end encrypted messages; device identifiers, timing and sizes. Cloudflare sees IP addresses.
Vercel, Supabase Only when linked API calls for the linked project

Peck has no telemetry, analytics or crash reporting, and none of its dependencies provides them.

3. Threat model

Peck assumes the agent is hostile. A prompt injection in a README or a package can take an agent over, and agents run with permission prompts off by default. Peck's controls therefore have to hold without the agent's cooperation.

Control What it stops
A container per workspace The agent reaching files on the computer outside its own project. Project configurations can't add host mounts, privileged mode, the engine's socket or extra capabilities.
No root inside the container The agent changing the firewall or the system. sudo is removed after every start.
Outbound firewall (allowlist) The agent sending data to arbitrary hosts. Everything not on the allowlist is refused, DNS goes only to the container's own resolver, and IPv6 is filtered or the container doesn't start.
Allowlist read from the computer The agent allowing its own domains. The project's allowlist file is read from the committed default branch, never from the agent's working copy, and new domains need a click by default.
Shared git folder clean-up The agent leaving hooks or settings that would make git on the computer run a program. This cleans up after the fact; see "The shared git folder" below.
Orchestrator lockdown The Orchestrator, an optional agent that works across projects, writing everywhere. It sees the projects folder read-only and has its own firewall.
Local API identity One container acting as another. Each container has its own token, and secrets are never returned to containers.
Settings only the person can change The agent relaxing a safety setting. Agents can't change firewall, remote access, host access, permission or account settings.
Organisation policy The person, or an agent, changing what IT decided (section 7).

Approving domains without a click. One setting, firewall.autoApprove, makes Peck grant an agent's domain request for its workspace without a click. It is off by default and has no switch in Settings. It can be turned on only by editing Peck's settings file on the computer, in a folder containers can't see, and Peck refuses any firewall change that comes from an agent. Every approval is written to the activity log. An agent that the person lets run directly on the computer, outside a container, can edit files there, including this one. The policy setting firewall.agentRequests: "off" stops domain requests altogether, whatever this setting says.

The shared git folder. A project's shared git folder is writable from its containers. Peck gives each container an empty hooks folder. It removes settings that would make git on the computer run a program, and undoes redirects such as a changed commondir, at every container start and stop and within about two seconds of a change while the container runs. A setting written and used inside that window, or a kind of setting Peck doesn't recognise, is not caught. If Peck can't check the settings, the workspace says so.

4. Credentials

5. Remote access (optional)

Remote access is off by default. Each device has a P-256 ECDSA identity key kept in its operating system's keychain. Sessions use ephemeral ECDH P-256, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM with counter nonces. The relay forwards opaque frames and can't read them. Pairing a device needs a click on the computer; pairings last 30 days and renew while in use, and any device can be revoked at once. Terminals open only from another of the person's computers, never from a phone.

The relay logs no IP addresses itself. Cloudflare's request logs, which include IP addresses, are kept for a sample of 1 in 100 requests. For each computer, the relay stores only the computer's relay identifier, the identifiers of revoked devices and hourly file-transfer counts for the last 24 hours.

6. Updates and build integrity

7. Admin controls

An organisation can deploy a policy.json file through its device management (MDM). The file can:

If Peck can't read the policy file, it fails closed. On macOS and Linux, Peck ignores a policy file that the person owns or can write to. On Windows, Peck applies the file at %ProgramData%\Peck\policy.json as it finds it, because it can't check Windows permissions itself, so IT must create the Peck folder so that only administrators can write to it.

Claude Code's managed settings files and Codex's managed config file on the computer are copied, owned by root, into every container. Settings delivered through a device-management profile or from the vendor's servers are not files, so they are not copied.

Peck keeps an activity log of approvals, pairings, workspaces, requests from paired devices and policy loads for 12 months. It can be exported from Settings.

8. Known limitations

9. Contact

Report security problems to security@devlin.ai. DEVLIN.AI LLC, Portland, Oregon.